Introduction
In 2005 the EU adopted a directive that stipulated that a range of industries within the EU were obliged to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing (Directive 2005/60/EC). The private actors were expected to take on a new role -as agents of the state -in preventing terrorist attacks. In this chapter we analyse the devolution of authority to corporate actors in the public security domain, and present some implications of this new authority for the responsibility and democratic accountability for designated corporate citizens.
A basic definition of the crime of money laundering is that it is the process through which the illegal source and unlawful application of illicit gains is concealed or disguised to the make the gains appear legitimate (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000) . The fight against this crime -anti-money laundering (AML) -has undergone two waves of transformations during the last twenty years. The first transformation took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s. AML was until then politically perceived as a financial crime to be managed at the national level. Since the inception of the global organization the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) in 1989, AML has been viewed as a global problem, especially in connection to drug trafficking.
A second wave of transformation in the field is occurring in the aftermath of 9/11, this time associated with 'the war on terror' (Mitsilegas, 2003; Amoore and de Goede, 2008; Helgesson and Mörth, 2012) . The war on terror narrative (Hodges, 2011) was evoked by President George W. Bush in his speech to a Joint Session of Congress, on 20 September: 'Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command … every financial influence … to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network'. With this speech, President Bush aimed to securitize the financial sector by publicly stating, to overwhelming Congressional and public appeal, that finance was as an explicit means to be used in the fighting against terrorism. The banking sector, and later on accountants and lawyers (Seyad, 2012), was from now on now expected to incorporate anti-money laundering as a security issue into its organization and its day-to-day activities. It is this second, and still ongoing, wave of transformation of AML that this chapter analyses.
We start out by delineating an analytical approach to ideas of the responsibility and democratic accountability of corporations in the emerging new public security domain that transgresses the traditional public-private divide. We then place the discussion of whether and how corporate actors can be responsible and democratically in the specific context of the increased transnational regulation urging the banking sector, and other private actors, to engage as partners in 'the war on terror'. We argue that the responsibilities for the surveillance of illicit financial flows have gradually been shifted to private actors, placing these actors in a rather delicate position. Notably, the designated corporate citizens need to strike a balance between complying with the directive on the one hand, and continuing to manage their clients with discretion and confidentiality, on the other. In the third section, we discuss how this balancing act may play out in practice by using illustrations from an on-going study. We show how two Swedish industry associations, in banking and law respectively, have quite different takes on their new position in the public security domain. In the concluding section we summarize our main points and provide ideas for future research. One conclusion is that the corporate actors may well have been made responsible, but it is questionable whether they are, or can be, democratically accountable.
Analytical framework
Security is an important public good. Security can mean many thingsfrom traditional military and state-centred threats, on the one hand, to societal and transnational problems, on the other (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). However, security is always about constituting something that needs to be secured, whether it is the planet or the state. The bulk of the literature on how for-profit actors are participating more in the 'production' of security policy-making, war and imposed war situations is very much based upon public security concepts and theories (Bailes
